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T
he growth in unsecured credit over the past two decades has, because
of current bankruptcy law, reduced the average welfare of the poor.
This striking conclusion emerges from a model designed to maximize
the beneﬁts of both plentiful unsecured credit and lax bankruptcy law. Even
exclusive concern for wealth redistribution does not provide self-evident jus-
tiﬁcation for lax bankruptcy law in the face of the unprecedented expansion
in unsecured credit occurring over the past two decades. Speciﬁcally, accord-
ing to the model, the welfare of low-income, low-asset households appears to
havefalleninresponsetothedramaticincreaseintheavailabilityofunsecured
credit that has occurred since the Marquette Supreme Court ruling in 1978.
The driving forces behind this welfare decrease are, ﬁrst, the role of lax per-
sonal bankruptcy law in thwarting debtors from credibly committing to repay
debts, second, the premium that the poor must pay to borrow on unsecured
credit markets, and third, the welfare loss from the imposition of deadweight
bankruptcypenalties. Beforediscussingthemodelingreaterdetail, Iwillturn
to a brief history of unsecured credit and personal bankruptcy in the United
States.
The Supreme Court ruling in 1978 in the case of Marquette National
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation, 439 US 299
(1978)wasawatershed. ThisrulingagainstMarquetteNationalBankallowed
a bank in nearby Nebraska, First of Omaha, to issue loans to residents of
MinnesotaatrateshigherthantheceilingineffectinMinnesota;themaximum
rate allowable in Nebraska was higher. Marquette argued that allowing First
of Omaha to export loans to Minnesota would undercut Minnesota’s usury
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Within two years, credit card lenders including Citibank and MBNA moved
to states with the highest interest rate ceilings, such as Delaware and South
Dakota, and began nationwide operations.
Since the 1978 ruling, low-income households in particular have seen
their access to uncollateralized credit grow dramatically, principally via credit
cards. The growth of this credit market enhanced the ability of U.S. house-
holds to deal with individual-speciﬁc and economywide risks by conveniently
allowingthemtoborrowmorewhentimesarebad. Thecreditcardindustry,in
particular, expanded enormously because lenders were given the opportunity
toofferuncollateralizedloansandshort-termcredittothosewithlittletangible
wealth. This expansion of unsecured credit mainly affected borrowers with
low tangible wealth. Others could credibly commit to repaying loans via col-
lateral, making usury laws a non-issue. Those who could not credibly commit
to repayment were most likely to be deemed unproﬁtable risks at interest rates
below the usury ceiling.
Personal bankruptcy law has a major impact on the ability of unsecured
borrowers to commit to repayment of loans. While intended to provide in-
surance against misfortune, these rules have the perverse effect of preventing
borrowers with little collateral from promising to repay a loan. Those who
hold collateral can and do avoid the constraints of bankruptcy protection and
facelowerborrowingcostsasaresult. Thosewithcollateralizablewealthalso
obtain all the transactions beneﬁts of credit cards without facing the annual
fees and relatively low credit limits typically imposed on low-income credit
card users. Therefore, the inability to commit to repayment even affects the
distribution of pure transactions cost beneﬁts made possible by recent rapid
advances in payment card technology.1
The growth in unsecured credit has been accompanied by an unprece-
dented rise in personal bankruptcy, thereby making bankruptcy law relevant
to welfare. The level of recent ﬁlings, currently greater than 1 percent of all
U.S. households, has led to calls for more stringent law by some, but has been
defended by others. The proponents of strict bankruptcy law argue that plen-
tiful unsecured credit and lax bankruptcy law give debtors an easy way out.2
Opponentsarguethatbankruptcyandeasilyavailableunsecuredcreditarelike
insurance and are therefore part of a larger social safety net. Both arguments
1Very recently, the advent of debit cards/check cards has helped high-risk borrowers obtain
transactions beneﬁts without paying the fees intended to reveal their risk proﬁle.
2 See, for example, the contrasting remarks of Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Sena-
tor Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) in congressional testimony on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000.
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contain some truth, and it is therefore certain that the welfare gains from the
increased availability of unsecured credit and additional implicit insurance
available through bankruptcy are tempered by a default premium.3
Thequestionwemustask,then,isthefollowing. Whatisthenetbeneﬁtor
costoftherapidexpansioninunsecuredlendingthathastakenplacefollowing
the Marquette ruling? This question, ﬁrst posed over a decade ago in the
seminal and prescient work of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989), has
since gone unanswered.
To the extent that bankruptcy provides additional all-purpose insurance
to American households, the rising rate of ﬁlings may simply represent a
wider group of borrowers cashing in an implicit insurance policy. This policy,
in turn, is priced appropriately by increased default premiums in loan rates.
From this perspective, the rising level of ﬁlings may not be anything to worry
about.4 Those arguing for tighter personal bankruptcy law must show that
the very option of easy bankruptcy retards the ability of households to tide
overﬂuctuationsintheirincomesbymakingborrowingexcessivelyexpensive,
or that easy bankruptcy lowers welfare by necessitating the frequent use of
socially costly “deadweight” penalties. In what follows, I demonstrate that
both of the preceding arguments can be made for U.S. households.
There has been no shortage of opinions on the impact of easy credit
and bankruptcy on the poor in recent times.5 Unfortunately, these views
are typically based on anecdotal evidence or static empirical approaches.
Such approaches typically cannot quantify the complex interactions between
the widespread availability of credit, the bankruptcy system, the behavior of
households trying to smooth temporary ﬂuctuations in their income and em-
ployment, and the interest rates they pay to borrow. This article presents
a simple, uniﬁed analysis of how changes in unsecured credit interact with
bankruptcy law to affect consumer welfare. The framework provides a pre-
liminary assessment of the net effects of the post-Marquette revolution in
unsecured credit and the attendant revolution in personal bankruptcy.
The expansion of credit to low-income households and bankruptcy pro-
tection is most often defended as helping to protect the poor against bad luck
and unscrupulous creditors. Therefore, this article stacks the deck in favor of
generating a positive role for expanded unsecured credit and lax bankruptcy.
3 By “default premium,” I am referring to the high interest rates paid by borrowers on the
unsecured market relative to those paid by secured borrowers, as with home equity loans.
4An analogy can be seen as follows. In general, we do not question the appropriateness of
allowing people to purchase hurricane insurance when we see people collecting on their policies
after a hurricane. Perhaps the insurance feature embedded in bankruptcy is no different, but if
not, why?
5 See The Washington Monthly (March 1997), and, again, the testimony of Senator Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa) and Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minn) at www.abiworld.org.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
To this end, I make three assumptions, discussed in detail later, that are de-
signed to maximize the beneﬁts of lax bankruptcy law as a means of wealth
redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Surprisingly, despite such assumptions, the existing combination of eas-
ily available unsecured credit and current bankruptcy law is found to reduce
welfare relative to the environment of tighter unsecured credit that prevailed
before 1978. The real welfare loss comes from a subset of low-income, low-
wealth households being prevented by bankruptcy law from credibly commit-
ting to repaying loans. One possible remedy is therefore to allow individuals
to pre-commit to debt rescheduling instead of being forced into Chapter 7
liquidation.6 The model also strongly suggests that U.S. households are ac-
tually less inclined to ﬁle for bankruptcy, all else equal, since the increase in
ﬁlingsiswellaccountedforbyanincreaseincreditavailabilitytolow-income
households. Therefore, contrary to the popular view, the stigma associated
with bankruptcy appears to be as strong as ever.7
1. MARQUETTE AND UNSECURED CREDIT
Bymakinglarge-scaleuncollateralizedlendingcommerciallyfeasible,atleast
inprinciple,theMarquetterulingsetthestageforovercominga“chicken-and-
egg” problem facing payment cards in general and credit cards in particular.
That is, how could an industry establish a large, smoothly functioning pay-
mentsystemwhenconsumerswouldonlyholdacardthatwaswidelyaccepted
and merchants would bear the costs of entering the given payment network
only if they felt that cardholding would expand sufﬁciently? As Evans and




cards more readily available to consumers across the country.”8 At the same
time that the construction of a payments network began, a revolution in credit
riskmanagementintheformof“creditscoring”wasunderway. Creditscoring
enabled credit issuers to predict fairly precisely overall losses on a large na-
tionwide portfolio of cardholders while remaining probabilistically uncertain
about the repayment behavior of any given cardholder. Credit scoring is an
6 Unfortunately, the difﬁculties associated with credible opt-out are daunting. In particular,
Section 362 in the bankruptcy code makes opt-out essentially unenforceable (personal communica-
tion with Professor Joseph Pomykala, July 27, 2001).
7 Bankruptcy stigma is deﬁned as feelings of guilt and shame and dispproval from others.
8Although I will maintain the assumption of competitive credit markets throughout, the fol-
lowing caveat is warranted. To the extent that Marquette removed the last vestiges of market
power by eliminating regional segmentation of credit market, the negative welfare consequences
presented here may be somewhat moderated.K.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 15
instrumental feature of today’s credit market, and has allowed better pricing
and increased availability of credit for all consumers, including those as seen
as “risky.”9
TheinterestrateceilingsinplacepriortoMarquetteappeartohavegreatly
limited the growth of this credit market. Canner and Fergus (1987) provide
a careful empirical analysis of the likely effects of Senate bills S.1603 and
S.1922. Each of these bills was aimed at imposing nationwide interest rate
ceilings. Canner and Fergus argue that existing interstate variation in in-
terest rate ceilings indicates that consumers in states with low ceilings face
greater difﬁculty in obtaining loans and would suffer if nationwide ceilings
wereimplemented. TheirargumentsarefurtherbuttressedbyVillegas(1989),
who cites evidence from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances that restric-
tive interest rate caps lower the availability of credit to high-risk borrowers,
often those who are poorest.10 Also suggestive is the dramatic increase in
the number of credit cards held by U.S. households beginning in the period
immediately following Marquette. In 1981, there were 572 million credit
cards outstanding, and by 1987, this number had risen to 841 million. Lastly,
the detailed empirical analyses of Evans and Schmalensee (1999), Black and
Morgan (1999), Moss and Johnson (2000), and Ellis (1998), provide clear ac-
countsofthedisproportionatelyrapidincreaseinunsecuredcreditavailability
amongthosewithlowincomes. Giventhepreceding,amaintainedhypothesis
of this article is that the increased availability of commercial unsecured con-
sumer credit did not simply displace existing informal credit arrangements,
but substantially relaxed the liquidity constraints faced by poor households.
2. BANKRUPTCY FACTS
I will now brieﬂy document the revolution in personal bankruptcy ﬁling rates
thathasaccompaniedtherevolutioninunsecuredcredit. Whilebusinessﬁlings
remained a negligible and steady fraction of the total number of bankruptcies,
non-business ﬁlings have increased dramatically. First, as seen in Figure 1,
total non-business ﬁling rose from roughly 250,000 ﬁlings in 1980, just after
the Marquette ruling, to roughly 1.3 million in each year from 1997 to 2000.11
Thisisanincreaseinﬁlingratefromroughly1in400householdstomorethan
9 See Evans and Schmalensee (1998, pp. 95–97, 251).
10 See also The Economist (November 1998), which details the stark differences in credit
availibility on either side of the border town of Texarkana. On the Texas side, lending and pur-
chases of consumer durables ﬂourishes, while it stagnates on the Arkansas side.
11 2001 is already on pace to break all previous records, with the second highest number of
ﬁlings ever recorded in the ﬁrst quarter. Source: American Bankruptcy Institute, www.abiworld.org.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1 per 100 households.12 The volume of debt discharged in these bankruptcies
had grown to roughly $40 billion in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.
The losses above arose primarily from what are known as Chapter 7
bankruptcies. A Chapter 7 ﬁling removes all unsecured debt from the debtor’s
balance sheet in exchange for all “nonexempt” assets that are held by the
household. Of the 1.4 million bankruptcies in 1997, over 70 percent—nearly
one million ﬁlings—were Chapter 7 ﬁlings. The average debtor in a Chapter
7 bankruptcy defaulted on an average of $35,000 in 1997.13 Chapter 7 ﬁlings
alone led to losses of $36.4 billion. Although Chapter 13 bankruptcies es-
sentially reschedule secured debts, and therefore result in very low losses of
secureddebtrelativetoChapter7bankruptcies,theystillresultinthedischarge
of most unsecured debt. For example, in a study by Wharton Econometric
Forecasting Associates (WEFA), in 1997, approximately 90 percent of the
$6.5 billion in total unsecured debt in Chapter 13 bankruptcy was not repaid.
For the purposes of this article, my focus will be on unsecured debt; therefore,
I do not distinguish between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 ﬁlings.
With respect to the identity of the ﬁlers described above, note ﬁrst that
the income gap between bankruptcy ﬁlers and average households reﬂects a
systematic difference in occupational structure as well as education levels.
Luckett (1988) ﬁnds that bankruptcy occurs most often among low-income
individualsworkinginunskilledoccupations.14 Empirically, thelinkbetween
low-meanincomeandhighvolatilityisdocumentedclearlyinKydland(1984)
and will be the basis for my parameterization of labor income risk.
A large portion of bankruptcies result from the disruption of labor income
due to job loss, sickness, or other factors.15 In their landmark study, Sullivan,
Warren,andWestbrook(1989)ﬁndthatroughly80percentofbankruptcyﬁlers
in their 1981 sample reported an income change in the two years previous to
ﬁling. Ofthese,62percenthadexperiencedachangeinincomeofgreaterthan
10 percent over the previous year, and of those whose income fell, the mean
decline was 37.2 percent!16 Additionally, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
ﬁnd that the median and mean incomes in their sample of bankruptcy ﬁlers
12 The median state in the United States had almost exactly one ﬁling per 100 households
in 2000. Source: American Bankruptcy Institute.
13 Culhane and White (1999).
14 Interestingly, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989) also ﬁnd that while the mean incomes
of bankrupts are lower than average, the distribution of these workers by industry across the labor
force mirrors that of the general population.
15 See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, pp. 95–101, 187).
16 To quote Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989), “these ﬁgures portray highly volatile
income streams, making a mismatch between debts and income likely.”
To be more precise, what is true is that a “mismatch” between debts and income is more
likely conditional on a level of debt. However, the level of debt taken on by a household de-
pends, among other things, on income volatility and bankruptcy law. Therefore, the unconditonal
likelihood of a mismatch may or may not be more likely.K.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 17
werebothroughlytwo-thirdsthatoftheaveragehousehold. Itiscleartherefore
that unsecured debt and bankruptcy protection together form an all-purpose
insurance policy against the hardships caused by volatile and low incomes.17
Bankruptcy is not, however, an insurance policy given to households for
free. Beyond increased interest rates on unsecured loans, there are four types
of costs to the debtor associated with bankruptcy. First, and most importantly,
bankruptcy results in at least some exclusion from credit markets. Second,
there are costs associated with the surrender of nonexempt assets, and, more
rarely, with possible future wage garnishments. Third, stigma appears to play
a role (see Fay, Hurst, and White [1996] and Gross and Souleles [2000]).
Finally, although they are usually small, there are explicit costs, such as those
such as those arising from court dates or lawyer’s fees.
In practice, bankruptcy almost never involves the transfer of assets or
income from debtor to creditor. Over 95 percent of Chapter 7 bankruptcies
are“no-asset”cases.18 Almostallbankruptcypenaltiesleviedondebtorsﬁling
for bankruptcy therefore constitute deadweight losses. Deadweight costs are
importantfortworeasons. First, byconstruction, bankruptcyistypicallyused
only by those who do not have a great deal of material wealth. Second, even
when debtors have wealth at the time of ﬁling, it is often difﬁcult to seize it
in the presence of various exemptions. Therefore, the only remaining route
to arrange transfers from borrowers to lenders is via wage garnishing, which
is rarely used.19 The inability to seize future income further requires that the
vastmajorityofpenaltiesforbankruptcybethoseinvolvingpunishmentofthe
borrower without wealth transfers to the lender. The reliance on deadweight
penalties clearly hinders the ability of bankruptcy to function as a welfare-
improving, risk-bearinginstitution. Thisisanimportantpartofthearguments
for stricter, but ﬁnite, penalties for bankruptcy (see Dubey, Geanakoplos, and
Shubik [2000]).
I turn now to a description of formal economic environments in order
to study the consequences of alternative credit market arrangements, with
speciﬁc reference to the growth of unsecured credit availability among lower-
income households.
17 Such volatility may understate the full risk faced by the uninsured, as illness can cause
shocks to expenses as well as income.
18 See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, pp. 201–18).
19 See again Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, pp. 22–24). In particular, bankruptcy
also stops garnishments.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
3. A MODEL OF UNSECURED CREDITAND BANKRUPTCY
My model is speciﬁcally aimed at understanding the welfare, price, and quan-
tity consequences of the dramatic change in the distribution of unsecured
consumer credit over the past two decades.
Preferences
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents with constant relative risk-
aversion (CRRA) preferences. This standard formulation captures risk aver-
sion, the desire for smooth consumption, and the concern households have for
futuregenerations. Theparameterβ ∈ (0,1)indicatestherateatwhichfuture
consumption is discounted, and the parameter α indicates the risk aversion, as









where ct is consumption at time t.
Labor Income
Therearetwotypesofagentswhowillreceivesystematicallydifferentincomes
over time. These differences are meant to capture the higher average income
and lower income risk faced by skilled individuals. I further assume that the
type of a household is unobservable to a lender. This assumption is plausible
because credit reports do not contain labor income, other than self-reported
measures at the time of application.20 The type of household is denoted by
i ∈ I, where i = h indicates high average income households and i = l
indicates low-income households. The proportion of high-income agents in
thepopulationisdenotedbyω,andlow-incomeagentsrepresenttheremaining
fraction (1 − ω) in the population. Labor income i is denoted by  Y i and can
take on two values, Y i
g and Y i
b. The subscripts g and b denote income in the
good and bad states respectively, and Y h
g >Yl
g and Y h
b >Yl
b. Let mean income





income also evolves smoothly over time in the sense that current (annual)
income is helpful to an individual for estimating future income. I denote by
pi
gg the probability that income next period is good if income this period is
20 While it is true that a borrower may reveal some information on his or her type via
serious deliquency behavior, this is typically too late for risk managment purposes. See Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook (1989, p. 187) for more.K.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 19
good. The probability of staying in the bad income state is given by pi
bb. The
forecastability of future income allows agents to plan savings or borrowing to
keep consumption smooth.
Consumer Debt, Savings, and Intermediaries
Despite the large levels of default, the market for unsecured credit in the
United States does function smoothly, and it is well characterized as a large
competitive marketplace where price-taking lenders issue credit through the
purchase of securities backed by repayments from those who borrow.21 These
transactions are intermediated principally by credit card issuers. The inter-
est rates charged by credit card issuers are not individually tailored for each
account but instead cover the aggregate default rate. The typical credit card
contract is described by a ﬁxed interest rate and credit line. Interest rates are
typically rather insensitive to changes in individual debt levels, even though
the marginal likelihood of default may change.
Giventhepreceding,Iassumethatinordertosmoothconsumption,agents
have access to competitive markets wherein they may borrow or save assets.
An agent’s ﬁnancial wealth is denoted at, where at > 0 represents saving and
at < 0 represents borrowing. Agents may borrow at the going interest rate
on loans (1 + rl) or save by holding deposits at the interest rate (1 + rd).
Note that the interest rate on loans does not vary with an agent’s type, income,
or current wealth level. This invariance reﬂects an assumption that lenders
are unable to differentiate between households. Each agent of type i faces a
borrowing limit Ai.22 Borrowing limits play a central role in the model, and
I will study outcomes arising from a variety of values for them.
Bankruptcy in the Model
Bankruptcy works in the model as follows. When an individual ﬁles, his or
her debts are removed and he or she is then penalized in two ways. First,
an agent is prevented from borrowing (i.e., is borrowing constrained) for an
uncertain length of time, although the average length of this period, ρ,i s
known to the agent. During this period of exile from loan markets, agents
may still save to meet contingencies. After this time, they may borrow freely
21A strong case can be made for the appropriateness of this characterization. See Evans
and Schmalensee (1999) and the references therein. Lest one think that lax bankruptcy would
be obviously desirable if the credit card industry were monopolistic, note that the brunt of high
borrowing costs for unsecured credit are borne not by the wealthy, who have cheaper secured
borrowing available to them, but by the poor and those with low collateralizable wealth. Therefore,
the competitive assumption may actually make lax bankruptcy law easier to defend.
22As with incomplete insurance contracts, borrowing limits (the rationing of credit) can be
derived from more primitive assumptions on the structure of information possessed by lenders and
borrowers. We avoid this complication here and directly assume credit limits.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and are considered solvent. Agents in the borrowing constrained state are
probabilistically returned to credit markets, whereby with probability 1/ρ
they are returned to solvency (i.e., they are free to borrow and default in the
following period), and with probability (1−1/ρ) they are still restricted from
borrowing or defaulting.
The second feature of bankruptcy in the model is that the ﬁler is penalized
in the ways discussed earlier. However, given that these penalties do not
involve resource transfers, and given that the sum of these various penalties
governs behavior, I employ a penalty levied directly on utility. I use λi to
denoteallcostsofbankruptcy,intermsofutility,toatype-i householdbeyond
those costs accruing directly from credit market exclusion; this includes legal
fees and the psychic costs of stigma.
The combination of easily available unsecured credit and lax personal
bankruptcy law is often seen as beneﬁcial for the unlucky poor against the
ravages of bad luck and greedy creditors. In order to give this view its best
day in court, I proceed as follows.
Assumption 1 Onlylow-meanincomeagentswillchoosetoﬁleforbankruptcy.
Assumption 1 simply assumes that the cost of bankruptcy to high-mean
income households is so high that they never declare bankruptcy. As was
argued earlier, this assumption is supported by the evidence that ﬁlers have
systematically lower paying occupations than non-ﬁlers (see again Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook [1989]). Assumption 1 blunts the argument that we
shouldtightenbankruptcylawtodefendthepoorfromtheexcessesoftherich;
this argument is frequently heard from proponents of tougher law whenever a
high-proﬁle case of bankruptcy surfaces.23
The Consumer’s Choice Problem24
The consumer’s choice problem is most naturally expressed recursively. Spe-
ciﬁcally, at a point in time an agent can be solvent (denoted S ), bankrupt
(denoted B ), or borrowing constrained (denoted BC). The value to an agent
of having a given level of current income, asset holdings, and credit market
status (borrowing constrained or solvent) can be expressed in terms of utility
from choices over current consumption/savings and credit market status (if
solvent) and the expected future value of those choices. I restrict borrowing
according to an agent’s credit status as follows. For solvent agents of type
23As in the cases of the actor Burt Reynolds and former Commissioner of Major League
Baseball Bowie Kuhn.
24 This section and the following section deﬁning equilibrium may be skipped by those
primarily interested in the results.K.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 21
i, net assets must be greater than the borrowing limit, Ai
S, and for borrowing
constrained agents, Ai
BC. There are no restrictions on savings.
Each period, given their current income and beginning-of-period assets,
agents must choose consumption, c, and asset holdings, denoted a , to carry
forward into the next period. Depending on whether they choose to be net
borrowers or lenders, they face either the net rate of interest on loans rl or on
deposits rd, where rl>r d.
When an agent is solvent and qualiﬁes for bankruptcy protection, he or
she must ﬁrst choose whether or not to ﬁle and then choose assets subject
to the constraints for solvent or borrowing constrained agents, depending on
theirdefaultdecision. Inowintroducetwopiecesofnotation. First,thevector
(a,y) is an agent’s current period state conditional on credit status. With this
notation, the value of being solvent V i






S denotes the value of not ﬁling for bankruptcy in the current period,
and satisﬁes
Wi






≤ y + a (2)
a  ≥ Ai
S, (3)
where r is understood to be the interest rate on loans rl if assets are negative
and the rate on deposits rd if assets are positive.
Bankruptcy is relevant to only those with debts, i.e., to households with
assets a<0. When the agent ﬁles for bankruptcy, he or she has his or her
debt removed, pays the cost of bankruptcy, λi, and is sent with probability
one to the borrowing constrained state, where he or she obtains value V i
BC.
Therefore, the value of ﬁling for bankruptcy, denoted Wi
B, satisﬁes
Wi





1 + rd ≤ y (4)
a  ≥ 0. (5)22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
To deﬁne V i
BC above, note that agents in the borrowing constrained state
areprobabilisticallyreturnedtocreditmarkets, wherebywithprobability1/ρ,
they are returned to solvency (i.e., they are free to borrow and default in the
followingperiod), andwithprobability(1−1/ρ), theyarestillrestrictedfrom
borrowing or defaulting. Let ψ ≡ 1/ρ. Thus,
V i
BC(a,y) = max{u(c) + ψβEVi





1 + rd ≤ yi + a, (6)
a  ≥ Ai
BC. (7)
I turn now to the deﬁnition of equilibrium in the model.
Equilibrium
The consumer choice problem above captures the decisions of a very large
number of households. However, given the absence of perfect income insur-
ance, households who have received many bad income shocks are likely to
ﬁnd themselves in debt, while those who have been lucky will hold perhaps
large levels of savings. Their choices are governed by a decision rule, which,
for a household of type i, speciﬁes asset holdings as a function of interest
rates, income, current assets, and borrowing constraints.
An equilibrium consists of a decision rule for each type of agent and
interest rates rl and rd such that four requirements are met. First, given
these interest rates, decision roles are optimal and feasible. Second, total
economywide borrowing by households equals total economywide saving.
Third, I restrict attention to steady state equilibria where the bankruptcy rate
  and fraction of agents in the population with a given level of assets are
stationary,i.e.,thesameateverydate. Fourth,Irequirethatthespreadbetween
loan and deposit rates is such that ﬁnancial intermediaries exactly cover their
costs, given the observed bankruptcy rate.
Parameterization
The assumption of stationarity implies that the analysis here is appropriate as
a study of two different long-run situations, one in the pre-Marquette era and
one currently prevailing. The relatively ﬂat bankruptcy rate over the past four
yearssuggeststhatatthispointinthepost-Marquetteerawemayhaveattained
a new steady state. Given the preceding, the overall strategy is as follows. I
will ﬁrst choose a set of parameters such that the equilibrium outcomes matchK.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 23
salient features of the pre-Marquette environment. In particular, I will set
the parameters to match bankruptcy ﬁling rates in the pre-Marquette era. I
will then choose alternative values for the nonpecuniary costs of bankruptcy,
credit limits, and the parameter governing the average period that bankrupt
borrowers are excluded from the credit market, such that the model matches
outcomes in the post-Marquette world.
I am assuming that the post-Marquette expansion in bankruptcy rates
resultedfromtheincreasedeasewithwhichborrowerswhodeclarebankruptcy
are able to borrow again, along with an increase in borrowing limits and a
reduction in the costs of ﬁling for bankruptcy, notably in terms of stigma.
Allotherparameterswillremainﬁxedinboththepre-andpost-Marquette
erasandaresettomatchcertainstatisticsconcerningincomeriskintheUnited
States. Speciﬁcally, the income processes are set to match observed persis-
tence and volatility by skill level, along with the observed skill-premium, and
are summarized in Table 1. For brevity, I do not give exhaustive details on
these parameters, but rather refer the interested reader to the detailed discus-
sions in Athreya (2000a,b), as well as to Kydland (1984), Heaton and Lucas
(1997), andAutor, Katz, and Kreuger (1998).
The welfare criterion used here measures the percentage change in con-
sumption, at all dates, that would make a household indifferent between the
pre- and post-Marquette eras. This increment/decrement to consumption is
denoted by φ. A negative value for φ implies that households are worse off in
the post-Marquette era, and a positive value implies the reverse. With respect
tothepolicieschosenbyasociety,ifitturnsoutthatthewelfareoflow-income
agents improves signiﬁcantly under lax bankruptcy law, even if that of high-
income people worsens signiﬁcantly, such a law may still be chosen. Given




creditors are unable to distinguish them from high-mean income borrowers.
That is:
Assumption 3 Creditors are not able to price-discriminate between high-
and low-mean agents.
This assumption implies the spreading of default costs not just across the
low-mean, high-volatility group, but across all high-mean agents as well. It is
inexactlythiswaythatbankruptcycanredistributewealthfromrichtopoor.25
25 See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, p. 187) for evidence that this is an appropriate
assumption.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
BycombiningAssumptions2and3withAssumption1,Ieffectivelyallow
for the most generous possible redistribution from high-mean income people





In current times (the post-Marquette era), the restriction on future borrowing,
denoted ρpost, is certainly less than ten years, as evidenced by the growth of
sub-prime lending. Lenders in this market, while typically more expensive
than credit card lenders, still allow agents access to loan markets following
default or bankruptcy within a year or two. I err on the side of strictness in the
penalty and set ρpost such that the average period of exile from credit markets
is four years. However, in the pre-Marquette era, exile for a period of ten
years may have been a reasonable estimate for the restriction on borrowing. I
therefore ﬁx the pre-Marquette exile parameter ρpre to imply an average exile
period of ten years.
Nonpecuniary Costs and the Bankruptcy Rate
The parameters λi will be inferred by the level that it must take in order to
match observed bankruptcy ﬁling rates in the pre- and post-Marquette eras,
given the applicable credit market penalties and credit limits. Assumption 1
simply requires that λh be set such that no high-mean income households ﬁles
for bankruptcy. The cost for low-mean income households, λl, is set to match
pre-Marquette ﬁling rates and is then used in the post-Marquette era, where
it will be denoted λl
fixed. When λl is reestimated in order to match the ﬁling
rate in the post-Marquette era, it will be denoted λl
endog.
In terms of bankruptcy rates, in 1978, the year of the Marquette ruling,
roughly 300,000 ﬁlings occurred in a 76 million household economy, which
implies a national ﬁling rate of 0.4 percent.26 In contrast, in 1998, total non-
business bankruptcy ﬁlings hit 1.4 million. Thus, of the roughly 100 million





26 Source: www.census.gov and abiworld.org.K.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 25
observed credit lines do not tell us how much additional credit lenders may
be willing to extend to households. We also observe true limits only for those
who are denied further credit, a group that may not represent the majority
of borrowers. However, that credit limits do bind for a subset of households
is well established (see Jappelli [1989]). I therefore study outcomes under
a variety of credit limits. Mean amounts discharged in personal bankruptcy




. With respect to high-income households, the model
here assumes that they do not ﬁle for bankruptcy, so their credit limits are less




To be consistent with the evidence discussed earlier, credit limits in the
pre-Marquette era will be kept at least as strict as those in the post-Marquette
era. Mean amounts discharged in bankruptcy were much smaller in the pe-
riod immediately following Marquette, at close to annual income, than in
currenttimes. However, asharddataoncreditlimitsisnotavailable, Iexplore








and lastly to annual income (Al
s−pre =− Y
l
). The pre-Marquette limit for
high-mean income households is also smaller than in the post-Marquette era,
andissetsuchthatAh
s−pre isroughlyone-and-a-halftimes(high)annualmean
income. By setting Al
s−pre =− 0.5Y
l
, the benchmark case considers the most
generous increase in credit availability to low-mean income households. The
set of ﬁxed parameters is given in Table 1.
Results
The two main results of this article are as follows.
Result 1 The stigma-related costs of bankruptcy have risen over the post-
Marquette period, not fallen, as has often been suggested.
Result 2 Thepost-Marquetteexpansioninunsecuredcreditandcurrentbank-
ruptcy law have together actually lowered the welfare of low-mean income
households.
I begin by providing intuition for the ﬁrst result. It has by all accounts
become distinctly easier to borrow following a bankruptcy in the past decade,
as seen in the growth of sub-prime lending, i.e., average credit market exclu-
sion times have fallen. Given the fall in credit exclusion, the model may or
may not be able to capture observed ﬁling rates. Subsequently, I relax this
assumption and compare welfare under states in a setting that allows for time-
varyinglevelsofthesedifﬁcult-to-observecosts. Whenλl isreestimatedinthe
post-Marquette period, it will be set to reproduce observed ﬁling rates, given26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Fixed Parameters
Parameter Value Source
β 0.96 Aiyagari (1994)
α 2.00
pi
















l Huggett (1993); Sullivan et al.
Ah
s−post −2Y
h (1989); Culhane and White (1999)
ω 0.386 Autor, Katz, and Kreuger (1998)
rd 0.035
the post-Marquette term of exclusion from credit markets. This reestimation
will allow for the possibility that stigma effects may have changed in recent
years, as recent work by Gross and Souleles (1998) suggests. In particular,
the assertion that stigma has fallen over time can and will be directly tested by
the reestimation of λl in the post-Marquette era. It turns out that even under
the assumption that credit market exclusion continues for ten years, the esti-
mated nonpecuniary cost for the pre-Marquette period implies substantially
higher bankruptcy rates than have been observed. This result is displayed in
Table 2 and is obtained by recomputing the implied penalties, beyond credit
market exclusion, that are required to generate the observed ﬁling rate in the
post-Marquette period. I ﬁnd that these penalties, when estimated in the pre-
Marquette era and applied to the post-Marquette era, produce far too many
ﬁlings given the current availability of unsecured credit.
Theprecedingisasurprisingimplicationofthemodel,anditsuggeststhat
stigma effects haven’t fallen in the manner often suggested. For an example
of such a suggestion, see Senator Charles Grassley, who states in a May
17, 1997, PBS interview, “There is no shame anymore with bankruptcy” (in
“Going for Broke,” A News Hour with Jim Lehrer transcript, May 17, 1999).
For a contrasting view, note the remarks of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Joe Lee,
who states, “I don’t see many people cavalier about bankruptcy. The reason
for so many bankruptcies is because consumer credit is so overwhelming”
(“No More Stigma in Being Broke?” July 25, 2001, Cincinnati Enquirer).
Anecdotal evidence suggesting that credit market exclusion may not be thatK.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 27
severe can be seen in the explosion of “no credit, bad credit,...noproblem”
advertising populating late-night television.
To understand the second result, I now turn to the results of a quantitative
exercise. The benchmark case evaluates the effects of increasing unsecured
credit availability when the pre-Marquette credit limit for low-mean income
agents is set at Al
s−pre =− 0.5. The results are presented in Table 2. In
the ﬁrst column of Table 2, I report outcomes for bankruptcy rates, interest
rates, consumption, and asset volatility for the pre-Marquette era. In the
second column, I present the outcomes obtained from the post-Marquette
environment, when the nonpecuniary costs of bankruptcy are held at their
calibrated value from the pre-Marquette era. The third column also presents
the results after the move to a post-Marquette environment; however, in this
case the nonpecuniary costs are recalibrated such that the model matches the
post-Marquette bankruptcy rate of 1.4 percent.27
Iﬁndthattheinterestrateonunsecuredloansis9.0percent,closetoitstrue
value in 1980 (see Evans and Schmalensee [1999], p. 239). The coefﬁcient of
variation in consumption, denoted cv(cl) and cv(ch) for low- and high-mean
income households respectively, is roughly one-third that of income for both
high- and low-income households. The relatively low ratio of consumption-
to-income volatility suggests that even with low bankruptcy rates, households
do a good job of smoothing their consumption using asset markets, such as
savings accounts and credit cards.
Turning to speciﬁcs, note ﬁrst that as we move from the pre-Marquette
era to the present, holding λ ﬁxed, bankruptcy rates skyrocket, along with
interest rates on unsecured loans. The bankruptcy rate reaches a counterfac-
tually high level of 4.8 percent. The interest rate on unsecured loans is 18.6
percent,alsohigherthantheobservedrateofapproximately12.5percent. The
volatility of consumption rises for two reasons. First, as the loan rate rises,
borrowing becomes less useful in smoothing. Second, and perhaps more im-
portant, is the discrete jump upward of consumption in the periods following
a bankruptcy. That is, bankruptcy is an immediate discharge of debts, and
thus net wealth rises sharply when a household ﬁles for bankruptcy, thereby
inducing a concurrent rise in consumption.
Theimmediateimpactonwelfareislarge. Underawelfarecriterionwhere
only low-mean income households matter, denoted φlow, the welfare of the
poor agent is reduced by an amount equivalent to taking away 3.51 percent of
the household’s consumption at all dates, regardless of income. Alternatively,
the median household would experience a loss equal to an income reduction
27 Note that I model high-income households as having seen their access to unsecured credit
grow. However, given the reliance of this group on secured debt, and the low incidence of
bankruptcy in this group, it is not important that its ability to borrow in the unsecured market
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  0.40% 4.80% 1.40%
rl 9.00% 18.60% 11.60%
rd 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%
cv(cl) 0.125 0.212 0.118
cv(ch) 0.051 0.051 0.051
φlow n.a. −3.51% −2.83%
φequal n.a. −2.52% −2.02%
of roughly $900. When the welfare criterion weights all households equally,
welfare losses still fall, but by less, as seen in the row headed by φequal.
Consumption is much less smooth than before, and interest rates are far
higherthanthe9.0percentlevelofthepre-Marquetteera. Additionally,eachof
the large number of ﬁlings induces the imposition of nonpecuniary penalties,
which, ex-post, imply substantial deadweight loss for society. When nonpe-
cuniarycostsarerecalibrated,however,thesewelfarelossesshrinksomewhat,
to −2.83 percent when the welfare of only low-mean income households is
taken into account. Thus, although the recalibrated cost λl
endog is larger, at
1.48 relative to 0.60, the reduction in bankruptcy rates from 4.8 percent to
1.4 percent reduces deadweight loss substantially. In turn, interest rates on
loans fall, from 18.6 percent under the pre-Marquette nonpecuniary cost of
0.60 to 11.6 percent. The consumption of high-mean income agents is much
smoother in all cases, at 0.051.
Thus, with respect to the question of whether households are better off
with the increased credit available today, even if it has brought with it more
bankruptcy, the answer is “no.” This result obtains even though three strong
assumptions were made in an attempt to enhance the role of easily available
unsecured credit and easy bankruptcy. Even when lenders are forced to price
loans according to average behavior in the population as a whole, when only
low-meanincomehouseholdsﬁleforbankruptcy,Iﬁndthatbankruptcylowers
welfare. Furthermore, this result holds even when all welfare weight is placedK.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 29
on the poor. The ﬁrst reason for the fall in welfare is that households appear to
smoothconsumptionfairlywellwithoutbankruptcy,soforcingthemtobuythe
option to ﬁle is wasteful. Secondly, easy bankruptcy implies frequent use of
deadweightpenaltiessuchascreditmarketexclusionandstigma. Suchpenal-
ties reduce welfare when imposed after the fact. A third reason is that interest
rates on loans rise dramatically, and when credit limits are increased, each
bankruptcy discharges more debt than before. Therefore, similar bankruptcy
rates may imply a substantially higher interest rate on loans.
The results above are quite robust to credit limits for the poor in the pre-
Marquette period. As credit limits are relaxed, consumption becomes only
slightly smoother, suggesting that even small amounts of credit are sufﬁcient
for patient consumers to effectively smooth temporary shocks. For concise-
ness, these results are not presented in detail here.
Stigma, Individual Debts, andWelfare
Interestingly, because it is hard to argue that credit limits are stricter now
than in the pre-Marquette era, and equally hard to argue that exclusion from
credit markets is greater now than before, we arrive at a somewhat contrarian
position. The United States is far from being a country where stigma and per-
sonal shame have fallen and where everyone is out to exploit the bankruptcy
system; instead, I ﬁnd that increased nonpecuniary penalties, unrelated to
statutory or creditor-imposed penalties, are necessary in order to explain ob-
served bankruptcy rates. In particular, given the slow growth rate of real
income among the unskilled, the rapid income growth of the skilled, and the
rapid increase in unsecured credit, it is puzzling why more households, espe-
cially high-income ones, did not ﬁle over the past two decades. This strongly
suggests that rumors of the demise of stigma and conscience are greatly ex-
aggerated.28
A ﬁnal point concerns mapping from individual circumstances at the time
of a bankruptcy ﬁling to inferences about the desirability of a bankruptcy
systemasawhole. Inallofthecasesconsideredinthisarticle,householdsonly
ﬁled for bankruptcy when they held the maximum allowable debt and were
then hit by the low income shock. Despite the fact the only the “desperate”
ﬁled for bankruptcy in this model, bankruptcy protection was still found to
be a welfare-reducing insurance system. Consider then the debate between
SenatorsCharlesGrassleyandPaulWellstonereferencedinfootnote2. Intheir
debate, much was made of the attitudes and circumstances of individuals in
bankruptcy, as if these considerations immediately made clear the desirability
or lack thereof, of bankruptcy. To the extent that the inability to opt out
28As noted earlier, this result survives even if the credit market exclusion period is ﬁxed in
both eras at ten years.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of bankruptcy protection lowers welfare, seeing people in dire straits at the
time of ﬁling may simply suggest that deadweight and nonpecuniary costs






credit with current bankruptcy law has led to a decrease in aggregate welfare.
That is, expanded unsecured credit, when combined with lax bankruptcy law,
helps some poor people at the expense of other poor people in a manner
that reduces overall welfare. Strikingly, the results presented here may even
understate the welfare costs of bankruptcy.
Perhaps a more subtle point is that in each of the experiments consid-
ered here, the households that ﬁled had hit their borrowing constraint. How-
ever, while households are almost always in desperate straits at the time of
bankruptcy, which might suggest that bankruptcy is being used wisely, this
circumstance in no way implies that the system overall is welfare-improving.
The penalties for bankruptcy are not deﬁnitively connected with the level of
debt defaulted on. Therefore, rational households have incentives to carry
large debts, although these incentives are balanced here by the possibility of
havingtoservicethem. Thatis, thepositionofhouseholdsatthetimeofﬁling
may say precious little about overall desirability of the bankruptcy system.
The latter has been a point of confusion in recent public debate.
ThemodeldevelopedherealsostronglysuggeststhatU.S.householdsare
actually less inclined to ﬁle for bankruptcy, all else equal, than they were in
the pre-Marquette era. That is, the increase in ﬁling rates is well accounted
for by an increase in credit available to low-income households. This result
echoes the work of Ellis (1998) and Moss and Johnson (2000).
The results presented here are perhaps a lower bound on the welfare loss
fromeasyunsecuredcreditandlaxbankruptcy. Ofthethreeassumptionsused
above,Assumption 1, that high-income households do not ﬁle for bankruptcy,
isparticularlyimportant. Whiletheassumptioncanberationalizedbysuppos-
ing that high-income agents face large nonpecuniary penalties for ﬁling, it is
not statutorily accurate. High-income people can, if anything, ﬁle more easily
than low-income people. The rich have smoother incomes, making exclusion
from credit markets less painful for them. At present, the rich can get more
credit, which will allow them to consume more prior to default. Therefore,
there is something very intangible keeping bankruptcy rates from being much
higher than they are.K.Athreya: Unsecured Credit 31
In terms of the desirability of returning to a pre-Marquette world, the
present-day environment is advantageous in that a large efﬁcient payments
network exists alongside substantially better credit risk management. The lat-
ter allows lending to a group that found borrowing difﬁcult before Marquette.
Thedownsideofthecurrentenvironmentisthatthemeanlevelofconsumption
volatility is still higher than it would be in a world where individuals could
credibly commit to repaying loans. Thus, the real welfare loss comes from a
subset of low-income, low-wealth households being prevented by bankruptcy
law from credibly committing to repaying loans. Additionally, the inability to
impose penalties that transfer resources from borrower to lender necessitates
high interest rates on unsecured credit and the frequent use of socially costly
bankruptcypenalties. Theselatterpenaltiesappeartorenderbankruptcyafun-
damentally inefﬁcient system for risk bearing. One possible remedy here is to
allow individuals to pre-commit to debt rescheduling, rather than to let them
be forced into Chapter 7 liquidation.29 If pre-commitment to debt reschedul-
ing in lieu of outright liquidation were allowed, those who wanted to retain
the option to ﬁle for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy could be charged a higher price
for the option, while others could opt out of Chapter 7 bankruptcy rather than
being forced to pay for it as they are now.
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